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Abstract
It is time for us to focus on sound analyses for our crit-
ical systems software—that is, we must focus on analy-
sesthatensuretheabsenceofdefectsofparticularknown
types, rather than best-effort bug-ﬁnding tools. This pa-
per presents three sample analyses for Linux that are
aimed at eliminating bugs relating to type safety, deallo-
cation, and blocking. These analyses rely on lightweight
programmer annotations and run-time checks in order to
make them practical and scalable. Sound analyses of this
sort can check a wide variety of properties and will ulti-
mately yield more reliable code than bug-ﬁnding alone.
1 Introduction
The strength of the systems community has long been
optimization, historically for performance. This “quanti-
tative approach” promotes common metrics and bench-
marks for key properties that in turn become metrics of
success for new work. But for properties such as se-
curity or privacy or safety, incremental progress against
a metric is not enough. For such properties we need
guarantees, although not necessarily requiring full pro-
gram veriﬁcation. For example, type checkers for strong
type systems routinely prove deep facts about large pro-
grams without imposing an unnecessary burden on the
programmer or the compiler. Guarantees for many im-
portant higher-level system properties can be obtained by
similarly practical techniques, even for existing systems.
In the realm of static analysis for systems code, the
systems community’s focus on optimization has been
manifested as a focus on bug-ﬁnding, where the metric
of performance is the number of bugs found. Although
this work has been very successful at revealing speciﬁc
ﬂaws in existing software, what we really want is a guar-
antee that no bugs of a speciﬁc type can occur—in other
words, we want sound static analysis.
The systems community has historically considered
soundness to require too much programmer effort to be
practical, either because it requires the programmer to
write complex proofs, or because it requires large-scale
rewriting of software in higher-level languages. In this
paper, we argue that it is practical to provide many im-
portantsoundnesspropertiesforlarge-scalesystemssoft-
ware, even when written in C, and indeed that this is the
approach that the community should be taking.
To demonstrate the feasibility of this approach, we
present three soundness tools that we have developed for
use with the Linux kernel. First, Deputy checks that a
pointer always points to valid data of the correct type,
even in presence of pointer arithmetic. Second, CCount
checks that objects are only freed when there are no dan-
gling references to them. Finally, BlockStop checks that
the kernel does not call blocking functions while inter-
rupts are disabled.
These tools have several properties that we believe are
essential to making soundness practical for large-scale
systems software such as the Linux kernel:
• Lightweight, untrusted annotations: Some anno-
tations to existing source code may be required, but
they are minimal, and they extend the type declara-
tions to express simple ideas that should make sense
to normal programmers. These annotations are not
trusted by the compiler, so errors in the annotations
will be caught along with errors in the code.
• Incremental porting: It is not necessary to anno-
tate an entire program at once in order to gain any
beneﬁt. The system can be made safe one ﬁle or
even one line at a time, with increasing levels of
safety as more code is annotated.
• Hybrid checking: Most operations are checked
statically, and the rest are checked at run time. Al-
though detecting bugs at compile time is preferable,
run-time checks are often necessary for practicality.
• Erasure semantics: The tools check, but do not
otherwise modify, the behavior of a program. An-notations are written such that they can be ignored
(“erased”) by the traditional build process. The pro-
gram is thus not locked into the tool.
• Trustedcode: Sometimesthebehaviorofaparticu-
lar code fragment is too complex for a practical tool
to be able to guarantee soundness. In this case, the
programmer should be allowed to mark the code as
trusted for the purpose of analysis, thus raising its
priority for code reviews and testing.
In addition, since we have written and inferred many
annotations in the course of this work, we propose a
shared repository of annotations and properties inferred
for the Linux kernel. This repository, discussed in Sec-
tion 3, would allow researchers to better collaborate
when building such sound analyses in the future.
The major contribution of this paper is the idea that
sound static analysis is a feasible and desirable alterna-
tive to bug-ﬁnding. In support of this idea, we present a
proof-of-concept Linux kernel showing that it is possible
to apply sound static analysis tools at a large scale, and
we present the basic principles of these tools that have
allowed us to achieve this scalability.
Of course, bug-ﬁnding tools still have their place in
the systems community. Heuristically checking complex
properties of systems is often much easier than design-
ing a sound static analysis, and in some sense, it can
be viewed as a precursor to a sound analysis. However,
we urge the community to focus on such sound analy-
ses whenever possible, since providing guarantees about
code will provide more lasting beneﬁts than simply ﬁnd-
ing bugs.
In the following section, we discuss each of our three
analyses in more detail. Then, we discuss some future
directions for research in sound analyses. Finally, we
discuss related work and conclude.
2 Sound Analyses for Linux
In this section, we discuss three analyses we have applied
to the Linux kernel thus far. This work was performed
on a stripped-down version of the Linux 2.6.15.5 kernel,
which consists of 443,000 lines of code. This kernel con-
tains enough code to boot in a VMWare virtual machine
and use standard ﬁle system and network services, but it
excludes the drivers for many other kinds of hardware.
We focused on this stripped-down kernel in order to
get a working system in place as fast as possible; how-
ever, with sufﬁcient manpower, there is no reason to be-
lieve that these results could not be extended to the full
Linux distribution. In other words, we omitted parts of
the Linux kernel for manpower reasons, not for technical
reasons.
2.1 Type Safety: Deputy
One major source of errors in Linux is the lack of type
safety in C programs. Although a signiﬁcant portion of
C code is type safe, there are a number of language fea-
tures and programming idioms whose safety cannot be
veriﬁed by the C compiler. For example, verifying the
correctness of array indices, union ﬁeld references, and
type casts is the sole responsibility of the programmer.
Our approach to handling this problem in the Linux
kernel is to use the Deputy type system [4]. Deputy al-
lows programmers to annotate pointer types with bounds
information written in terms of other variables in the en-
vironment. Deputy also allows annotations for unions,
null-terminated sequences, and polymorphic data. In re-
turn, Deputy is able to enforce the memory and type
safety of the program using a combination of static
checking and run-time checks. Note that these annota-
tions are not trusted by the compiler, so if the program-
merintroducesanerroneousannotation, thaterrorwillbe
caught along with any errors in the code itself. That said,
Deputy does allow the programmer to explicitly mark
code that should be trusted in cases where Deputy’s type
system is insufﬁcient.
Overall, Deputy guarantees that, at run time, the value
of every program expression corresponds to its compile-
time type, and in doing so, Deputy prevents out-of-
bounds array accesses and misuse of unions. Deputy as-
sumes that trusted code is correct and that code outside
thecurrentmoduleconformstotheprovidedannotations.
Unlike other safe C variants such as Cyclone [8] and
CCured [12], Deputy is incremental and thread safe.
That is, programmers are free to add annotations and
modify code function-by-function. This is possible be-
cause Deputy does not change the representation of the
data visible across function boundaries, which allows
“deputized” modules to interoperate with standard mod-
ules. While the initial version of the ﬁle may contain
several blocks of trusted code, subsequent versions will
gradually eliminate this trusted code in favor of fully an-
notated and checked code. The same holds of run-time
checks: programmers can gradually modify the code to
reduce the number of checks that must be deferred un-
til run time. This approach provides an incremental path
towards a fully-annotated and type-safe Linux kernel.
InordertoconvertcodetouseDeputy, wereplacegcc
with deputy in the kernel makeﬁles. When Deputy is
invoked on a C source ﬁle, it prints errors for any code
that is considered illegal in its type system, such as casts
betweenpointerswithdifferentbasetypes. Inordertore-
solve such errors, the programmer must add annotations
(such as information about bounds or polymorphism),
alter the code, or tell Deputy to trust the code. Once
Deputy accepts the code, it will insert any necessary run-
2Benchmark Rel. Perf. Benchmark Rel. Perf.
bw bzero 1.01 lat fs 1.35
bw ﬁle rd 0.98 lat fslayer 1.04
bw mem cp 1.00 lat mmap 1.41
bw mem rd 1.00 lat pipe 1.14
bw mem wr 1.06 lat proc 1.29
bw mmap rd 0.85 lat rpc 1.37
bw pipe 0.98 lat sig 1.31
bw tcp 0.83 lat syscall 0.74
lat connect 1.10 lat tcp 1.41
lat ctx 1.15 lat udp 1.48
lat ctx2 1.35
Table 1: Relative performance of the deputized Linux
kernel.
time checks and then compile with gcc. Booting the
new code typically results in a number of warning mes-
sages due to incorrect or incomplete annotations; once
these are revised, Linux runs as expected.
In previous work [18], we described our experience
using Deputy on Linux device drivers; however, we have
now begun to use Deputy on the Linux kernel itself (ver-
sion 2.6.15.5). So far, we have converted approximately
435,000 lines of kernel code to use Deputy, including
the basic kernel (kernel/, mm/ and arch/i386), the
networking stack (ipv4), several ﬁle systems including
ext2 and procfs, and a set of device drivers making the
kernel fully-functional in VMware and several machines
that the authors use. We added annotations on approxi-
mately 2627 lines (about 0.6%), and we are trusting ap-
proximately 3273 lines of code (less than 0.8%). This
conversion required approximately 7 person-weeks. The
conversion speed got signiﬁcantly faster in the later part
of the process, as the tool matures and we get better at
common patterns of using the annotations.
Table2.1showsrelativeperformanceofa1.6GhzPen-
tium M system with the Deputy-enabled kernel com-
pared to the original Linux kernel, measured with the
hbench[2] suite of benchmarks. Benchmarks starting
with bw are bandwidth tests and lat are latency tests.
MosttestsshowsthatDeputyincursverysmalloverhead.
The worst cases are a maximum slowdown of 17% for
the local TCP bandwidth test, and a 48% of latency in-
crease for the local UDP latency test. We believe that
these results are promising, since they suggest that type
safety can be achieved at a relatively small performance
cost.
2.2 Deallocation: CCount
Memory management bugs are a signiﬁcant cause of
software failures and vulnerabilities in C programs. If an
object is freed when references to it still exist, then sub-
sequentaccessestothefreedobjectmayactuallyaccessa
new object that has been allocated in the same space, re-
sulting in crashes, security vulnerabilities, and violations
of type-safety properties assumed by other analyses.
The standard way to avoid memory management prob-
lems is to use garbage collection, where objects are au-
tomatically freed when they are no longer referenced.
However, while previous work shows that it is possible
to build an operating system kernel that uses garbage col-
lection for memory management [7, 11, 16], we believe
that retroﬁtting a garbage collector onto a large legacy
kernel such as Linux would be extremely difﬁcult since
it would require making signiﬁcant changes to the way
the kernel manages memory.
We have also designed CCount, a C-to-C compiler and
runtime system that uses reference counting to check the
correctness of a C program’s existing manual memory
management. CCount’s compiler modiﬁes all pointer
writes to maintain an 8-bit reference count on each 16-
bytechunkofmemory(a6.25%spaceoverhead), andthe
runtime system uses this to check that frees are safe. Bad
frees of objects with k ∗ 256 references will be missed
by such a system, but we expect this to occur very in-
frequently in non-malicious code. For total safety, an
overﬂow check could be used.
Using CCount for the Linux kernel required two sig-
niﬁcant changes. First, we modiﬁed Linux’s mem-
ory management routines to check reference counts and
zero all allocated storage (necessary to avoid decrement-
ing random reference counts when initializing point-
ers).11 On failure, we log an error and (option-
ally) leak the object to guarantee soundness. Sec-
ond, CCount rewrites pointer writes such as ‘*a = b’
to ‘RC(b)++, RC(*a)--, *a = b’, where RC ac-
cesses the reference count of a pointer22. To support con-
current code, we must increment and decrement refer-
ence counts using atomic operations, and we must ensure
that the increment happens before the decrement to avoid
transitory zero reference counts. In contrast, we assume
that all pointer writes are already protected by appropri-
ate locks and so we do not translate the write itself into
an atomic operation. In the future, we plan to check that
this assumption does indeed hold using a concurrency
checker tool.
CCount requires accurate type information when ob-
jects are freed, copied (memcpy), or cleared (memset).
This information is generally similar to information
needed by Deputy, so we expect to reuse Deputy an-
notations in the future. However, we currently have to
1So far we have only modiﬁed kmalloc, kfree and the slab
allocators, but extending this support to vmalloc, vfree and
alloc page should be straightforward.
2At the time of writing, the kernel version of CCount does not track
references from local variables; however we expect to have that imple-
mented soon.
3provide some of this information “by hand”. On our
small kernel, we had to describe the layout of 32 types,
use explicit runtime type information in 27 places, and
change 50 uses of memset and memcpy to type-aware
versions. We believe that such modiﬁcations are accept-
able as long as they are made directly by the programmer
at the source level, where the programmer can consider
their consequences for performance and correctness, as
opposed to being made automatically by the compiler.
With these changes, CCount will boot and run our
small Linux kernel, but it reports many bad frees. We
ﬁx these bad frees by setting breakpoints at the bad free
report statement and tracking down the cause of the bad
free using our debugging facilities. Fixes to bad frees
involve nulling out some extra pointers, usually around
the time the corresponding object is freed (27 instances
so far33) and adding delayed free scopes (26 so far). A
delayed free scope simply delays all frees (and the asso-
ciated reference count check) that happen inside it until
its end, greatly simplifying the checks for complex or
cyclical data structures. We have spent approximately 6
person-weeks porting CCount and making these changes
to the Linux kernel, and we can now verify the correct-
ness of all of the ∼107k frees that occur from boot time
until the login prompt is available. Light use of the re-
sulting system (leaving it idle for a while and copying
a new kernel in via ssh) brings the percentage of good
frees slightly down to 98.5%. We are conﬁdent that fur-
ther debugging can eliminate the remaining bad frees.
We repeated Deputy’s fork and module-loading eval-
uations with CCount. The overheads for a uniprocessor
kernel were 19% for fork and 8% for module-loading.
For an SMP kernel, which needs “locked” increment,
decrement, and add operations for reference count up-
dates, the overheads were 63% for fork and 12% for
module-loading.44 We hope to improve these results
with compiler optimization and a better runtime system.
2.3 Call Graph Analysis: BlockStop
There are many other invariants beyond type and mem-
ory safety that must be enforced in the kernel. One tool
thatisusefulforseveraloftheseinvariantsisacallgraph.
Once we know which functions can be called where, we
can begin to analyze important control-ﬂow properties.
BlockStop is a whole-program analysis to enforce the
requirement that the kernel does not call any functions
that may block while interrupts are disabled, such as
while holding a spinlock or handling an interrupt. Once
we’ve run this analysis, we can emit an annotation for
each function (and function pointer) that might eventu-
3We also null out the pointer passed to free functions
4These numbers were measured on an Intel
R  Pentium
R  4, which
has relatively slow locked operations.
ally call a blocking function. Not only is this informa-
tion useful for humans trying to understand the code, but
the annotations can be checked incrementally whenever
a ﬁle is changed, which preserves separate compilation.
Acallgraphisadirectedgraphwhereeachnodecorre-
sponds to a function and each outgoing edge represents
the functions that it might call. The major challenge is
to account for calls through function pointers. We use
a whole-program points-to analysis to determine which
functions a given pointer could refer to. Thanks to the
type safety provided by Deputy and CCount, this points-
to analysis is sound, except that we do not currently de-
tect function calls made within inline assembly.
To ﬁnd which functions might block, we annotate cer-
tain functions with a new blocking attribute, such
as copy to/from user, wait for completion,
etc. Allocators such as kmalloc have a special anno-
tation to denote the fact that they may block if they are
called with the GFP WAIT ﬂag. We then propagate this
information backwards through the call graph to get a
sound approximation of the set of functions that might
block.
We ran this analysis on our test kernel, and found
two apparent bugs. We also encountered false positives,
mostly due to the overly-conservative points-to analy-
sis of function pointers. Replacing our simple points-
to analysis with one that is ﬁeld- and context- sensitive
would improve the results. To resolve these false posi-
tives, we turned to runtime checks. We deﬁned a special
function that panics if interrupts are disabled, and man-
ually inserted calls to this function in 15 places in the
kernel. For example, read chan is a blocking func-
tion that BlockStop’s points-to analysis incorrectly be-
lieves can be called by flush to ldisk while inter-
rupts are disabled. Adding the runtime check to the start
of read chan reﬂects our assertion that this function
will not actually be called by flush to ldisk. These
15 runtime checks silence all of the false positives.
3 Looking Forward
We believe that the three previous analyses represent
only the tip of the iceberg in terms of sound analyses that
can be used effectively on systems such as Linux. Here
we discuss proposals for future analyses as well as ideas
for making the results of these analyses widely available.
3.1 Future Analyses
There are many other opportunities to create sound anal-
yses with the properties we discussed.
First, we are in the early stages of designing a hybrid
checking tool for verifying lock safety in Linux. In ad-
dition to checking that deadlocks are impossible by ver-
4ifying that the code uses a consistent locking order, this
analysis will check Linux-speciﬁc invariants such as the
requirement that the same spinlock is not acquired in in-
terrupts and in process context with interrupts turned on.
Light annotations will be used to name the locks, and
run-time checks will be used when static checking does
not sufﬁce. We rely upon type and memory safety guar-
antees provided by Deputy and CCount.
Second, the call graph built for BlockStop can be used
to prevent stack overﬂow. Given a sound call graph and
information about the size of each stack frame, as in the
Capriccio thread package [15], we can ensure that every
possible chain of function calls stays within its allotted
4 or 8 kB of stack space. Stack space annotations on
each function will enable incremental veriﬁcation. For
recursive calls, run-time checks will be needed.
As a third example, it is possible to create a sim-
ple analysis for ensuring that error codes are properly
checked at call sites. Programmers can annotate each
functions with the set of codes that the function could
return, or the programmer could simply indicate to the
compiler that negative constant return values are error
codes. Then a ﬂow-sensitive analysis at call sites could
verify that each of the error codes are accounted for, ei-
ther together or separately. Calls through function point-
ers could use a merged list of codes from the functions
that the pointer may alias.
Further examples include user/kernel pointers, tainted
data ﬂow, and concurrency issues such as identifying
shared and thread-local data. All of these properties can
be checked by analyses that follow the framework out-
lined here: lightweight annotations with run-time checks
and trusted code where necessary.
3.2 Collaboration
A consequence of applying our tools to the Linux kernel
is that we have generated a large amount of information
about functions and types in the Linux kernel in a form
that is usable by the compiler. Some of this informa-
tion was generated manually by reading comments and
code, while other properties were inferred by our tools.
In order to make this information available to other re-
searchers and programmers, we propose the creation of
a collaborative database of source code information that
would allow different researchers and tools to share and
reuse information about publicly available source code
such as the Linux kernel.
For example, this database could provide pointer alias
information and bounds information for function argu-
ments and global variables within Linux. This informa-
tion is required by both Deputy and CCount, and it will
almost certainly be of use to future analyses. We can also
store information about blocking functions, error codes,
and so on. In addition to aiding researchers, this informa-
tion would also provide a useful reference for program-
mers who wish to see additional invariants that are not
speciﬁed directly in the code or comments. Indeed, with
the wide variety of possible analyses that we propose, it
may be useful for the programmer to store this informa-
tion on the side instead of cluttering up the code directly.
We have seeded this repository of annotations at
our web page: http://ivy.cs.berkeley.edu/.
Our Linux annotations are available here, and we encour-
age other researchers to help us in expanding the scope
of these annotations.
4 Related Work
We have previously written about the Deputy type sys-
tem [4], when we applied Deputy to Linux device drivers
as part of SafeDrive [18]. Prior to that work, some
of us worked on CCured, which was a predecessor to
Deputy [12]. In this work, we present our experience ap-
plying Deputy to a complete, bootable Linux kernel, and
we discuss the basic principles of both Deputy and our
other tools that allow us to scale these analyses to large
programs.
CSSV [5], Saber-C [9], and a number of other
projects [1, 14] are capable of verifying certain sound-
ness properties for C programs. However, we are not
aware of any previous attempt to apply such a tool to a
program as large and complex as the Linux kernel.
In addition, there exist several safe C variants, such as
CCured [12] and Cyclone [8], which attempt to impose a
stricter typing discipline on C programs. However, these
systems require changes to data structures that make an
incremental transition to these C variants difﬁcult.
Eau Claire [3], MC [6], and MECA [17] are three ex-
amples of bug-ﬁnding tools for systems software. While
these tools ﬁnd many important bugs, they do not guar-
antee that no more bugs exist, and they do not prevent
reintroduction of these bugs. Also, each run of these
tools requires a programmer to sift through false posi-
tives, whereas our approach yields a modiﬁed program
that checks cleanly after the initial programmer effort.
Projects such as Melange [10], JavaOS [11], and In-
ferno [16] have attempted to write systems code in safe
languages. However, when legacy code already exists in
C, we believe it would be easier to apply our soundness
tools to this legacy code than to rewrite the code in a safe
language. Our approach focuses on incremental tools
that allow programmers to preserve their investment in
existing code while improving its reliability.
55 Conclusion
It is estimated that software vulnerabilities cost $13 bil-
lion in 2001, $30 billion in 2002, and $55 billion in
2003 [13]. While bug-ﬁnding tools can be very helpful
in ﬁnding some of these defects, sound static analyses
allow us to guarantee their absence.
In this paper, we have discussed our experience thus
far in applying soundness tools to the Linux kernel. Our
results are encouraging: we were able to prevent most
type errors and buffer overruns in 81,000 lines of code
with only 2.5 weeks of effort, and we were able to ver-
ify 98% of the deallocations in a complete Linux kernel
with only 4 weeks of effort. We thus have reason to be-
lieve that it is both practical and wise to focus on making
systems software completely safe against such defects.
5
Notes
1So far we have only modiﬁed kmalloc, kfree and the slab
allocators, but extending this support to vmalloc, vfree and
alloc page should be straightforward.
2At the time of writing, the kernel version of CCount does not track
references from local variables; however we expect to have that imple-
mented soon.
3We also null out the pointer passed to free functions
4These numbers were measured on an Intel
R  Pentium
R  4, which
has relatively slow locked operations.
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